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He scans the horizon, using his one sunglassed eye: nothing. The sea is hot 
metal, the sky a bleached blue, except for the hole burnt in it by the sun. 
Everything is so empty. Water, sand, sky, trees, fragments of past time. 
Nobody to hear him…. He listens. The salt water is running down his face 
again. He never knows when that will happen and he can never stop it. 
His breath is coming in grasps, as if a giant hand is clenching around his 
chest—clench, release, clench. Senseless panic. (Margaret Atwood)
We keep enshrined in our minds our loved people. (Melanie Klein)
Introduction
In this paper I examine Kleinian mourning, melancholia and the notion of 
‘object-loss’ in an analysis of Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake. Little did 
I realize when I picked up this novel last summer that with the outbreak of 
BSE in Alberta, the SARS epidemic in Ontario, widespread wildfires across 
the entire northwest and even more recently with the outbreak of Avian Flu 
in Vancouver how shocked I would be to discover that this dark dystopia, 
in keeping with true modernist form, completely blurs the boundaries 
between fiction and reality. Atwood’s novel is a powerful and disturbing 
reminder of our times.
Atwood sets up a parallelism in the opening epigraph between Woolf’s 
‘Lily’ in To The Lighthouse and Atwood’s central protagonist, ‘Jimmy,’ in 
Oryx and Crake. As such, I will read Atwood alongside Klein and Woolf, 
as Atwood’s novel illuminates Kleinian theory in a contemporary context, 
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while at the same time receiving its inspiration from the lyrical prose 
of Woolf. Moreover, in the course of writing this paper, I have come to 
understand that not only is it crucial to read Atwood and Woolf together, 
but in the same sense that To the Lighthouse is a memorial to Woolf’s own 
mother, we can read Oryx and Crake as both a tribute to Woolf and a poignant 
reminder of the need for contemporary global and youth culture to work 
through its melancholia and mourn the “cultural and emotional losses 
of our pasts” (Sanchez-Pardo, p. 388). Which raises the most important 
question with respect to Kleinian melancholia and relates to the question 
posed here today by this symposium of what constitutes the condition of 
responsibility—and that is—“Where does the labor of melancholia end, 
and how, if at all, can we begin the work of mourning?” (Sanchez-Pardo, 
p. 15).
Kleinian Metapsychology and Consuming Identities
In the small hot room he dreams; again, it’s his mother. No, he never 
dreams about his mother, only about her absence. He’s in the kitchen. 
Whuff, goes the wind in his ear, a door closing. On a hook, her dressing 
gown is hanging, magenta, empty, frightening…. He wakes with his heart 
pounding. He remembers now that after she’d left he’d put it on, that 
dressing gown…. How much he had hated her at that moment. He could 
hardly breathe, he’d been suffocating with hatred, tears of hatred had 
been rolling down his cheeks. But he’d hugged his arms around himself. 
Her arms. (Margaret Atwood)
There is no subject without an object that is already lost. (Sanchez-Pardo)
Oryx and Crake offers up the melancholic figure of Jimmy (“Snowman”), who 
with the exception of a few bio and transgenetic life-forms—the Crakers, 
pigoons, wolvogs—is left to wander the crumbling and desolate remains 
of what is contemporary culture, brooding in isolation for something that 
is irretrievably lost. In the same way that To The Lighthouse portrays the 
loss of Mrs. Ramsay (Woolf’s mother) set against the back drop of the two 
world wars, Jimmy’s account of his personal loss—first of his mother, 
then of Oryx—is set against the traumatic destruction and loss of western 
culture. Like Mrs. Ramsay, who is identified with purple passion flowers 
and is associated with the maternal realm and primary identification, 
Jimmy’s mother is symbolized by her ‘magenta’ bathrobe. And, like Mrs. 
Ramsay who dies very suddenly, Jimmy’s mother simply slips away one 
day, leaving Jimmy ‘enraged’ and bereft. Snowman’s journey, back into his 
past and back to ‘Paradice’ (the high-tech bubble dome where the Crakers 
were created) tells the story of his attempt, albeit unsuccessful, to restore 
the lost object of love.
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Introjection and Projection
In Kleinian melancholic theory, personal and social loss is associated with 
the unmourned or unacknowledged death of the mother. Central to Klein’s 
theorization are the notions of introjection and projection. In a Kleinian 
framework, the infant, after experiencing the originary phantasy of violence, 
marked by the trauma of birth, will attempt to restore the lost loved object 
(the mother) through a process of introjection. In an infant introjected objects 
are associated with nursing and the breast. The mother is seen as someone 
who both gives and withholds gratification. As such, objects are divided into 
good and bad internal objects. The introjection of good objects is associated 
with the infant’s feeling of satisfaction and pleasure, while the introjection 
of bad objects is the result of frustration. According to Klein, feelings of 
frustration during weaning give rise to aggression and sadistic oral impulses 
to destroy the mother (the sadistic oral stage). The death drive or death 
instinct is an individual’s fear of becoming overwhelmed or annihilated by 
the introjected objects. Projection (the anal sadistic stage) is the mechanism 
by which the child expels objects which he perceives as hostile to him out 
of the self and into the world (Sanchez-Pardo, p. 61). Projection is a defense 
mechanism employed by the ego to prevent the build up of introjected 
objects. Klein concludes that subject identity formation is set in motion as a 
“result of an interaction between the projection of the individual’s sadistic 
impulses and the introjection of his objects” (Sanchez-Pardo, p. 63). Thus, 
introjection of the lost object of love is the first mechanism of melancholia. I 
will return to this a little further on.
Phantasy 
Closely related to introjection is the phantasy of incorporation—incorporating 
loved and hated objects. Phantasy in Kleinian thought is the unconscious 
mechanism which mediates between drive instincts, what Susan Isaacs 
refers to as “tissues of phantasy” and an external object (imagos)—a real 
loved person or part of a person or equivalent. Isaacs explains: “An instinct 
is conceived as a border-line psycho-somatic process. It has a body aim, 
directed to concrete external objects. It has a representative in the mind 
which we call a ‘phantasy.’ Human activities derive from instinctual urges; 
it is only through the phantasy of what would fulfill our instinctual needs 
that we are enabled to attempt to realize them in external reality” (p. 166). 
In other words, “phantasy is the operative link between instinct and ego 
mechanism” (p.166). And desire, according to Isaacs, is experienced as a 
“specific phantasy” (the first hallucination) which translates into ‘I want to 
suck the nipple” or “I want to eat her [my mother] all up” (Sanchez-Pardo, 
p. 165). Kleinians suggest the phantasy of incorporation—devouring, 
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consuming, absorbing—originates in frustration—the impossibility of ever 
satisfying desire. 
Descriptions of consuming and devouring pervade Atwood’s novel. 
We find both phantasies of incorporation associated with the introjection 
of good objects, which in Jimmy’s case are generally linked to sexual 
gratification, and bad objects, associated with hunger, which generate 
feelings of frustration, hostility and aggression. For instance, Snowman 
speaks of his ‘beastly appetites’ and ‘monstrousness’ where the Crakers 
“keep their distance and avert their eyes while he crams handfuls of fishiness 
into his mouth and sucks out the eyes and cheeks, groaning with pleasure 
… a rending and crunching, a horrible gobbling and gulping” (Atwood, p. 
101). Or, in this passage, where he exhibits oral sadistic impulses towards 
a luminous green rabbit, a transgenetic experiment associated with Oryx, 
nature, and the feminine realm: 
In the half-light the rabbit looks soft and almost translucent, like a piece of 
Turkish delight; as if you could suck off its fur like sugar…This one has no 
fear of him, though it fills him with carnivorous desires: he longs to whack it 
with a rock, tear it apart with his bare hands, then cram it into his mouth, fur 
and all. But rabbits … are sacred to Oryx herself, and it would be a bad idea to 
offend the women. (p. 96) 
Like an infant robbed of the breast, Jimmy is ‘stupefied’ and “can almost hear 
Oryx, laughing at him with indulgent, faintly malicious delight.” (p. 96) 
The incorporation of good objects, on the other hand, is represented 
by Oryx’s fetishized fingers and the consumption of food during moments 
of erotic jouissance, as in this passage where Snowman remembers “the 
pizza, then Oryx’s fingers in his mouth … then joy, crushing his whole 
body in its boa-constrictor grip…. Oh stolen secret picnics. Oh sweet 
delight. Oh clear memory, oh pure pain. Oh endless night” (p. 122). Or 
when he contemplates her fingers in his mouth in a very conscious act of 
incorporation, which we may understand to be an example of introjective 
identification where the mother is no longer felt to be a separate individual 
but is felt to be the good-self:
She licked her fingers, tore a Nubbin into bite-sized bits, fed one of the bits 
to Jimmy. Then she let him lick her fingers for her. He ran his tongue around 
the small ovals of her nails. This was the closest she could get to him without 
becoming food: she was in him, or part of her was in part of him….I’ll make you 
mine, lovers said in old books. They never say, I’ll make you me (p. 315).
Death Drive
The death instinct is an individual’s fear of annihilation or death caused 
by the introjected objects. The way an individual deals with this is through 
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projective identification with the mother. In a Kleinian view, sadistic 
impulses (aggression and hate projected onto the loved object) give rise 
to feelings of anxiety, guilt, and self-persecution. Klein writes that these 
feelings of anxiety and guilt and the reparative impulse are at the origin of 
the subject: “The feeling that the harm done to the loved object is caused 
by the subject’s aggressive impulses I take to be the essence of guilt….
The urge to undo or repair this harm results from the feeling that the 
subject has caused it, i.e. from guilt” (Sanchez-Pardo, p. 144). In addition, 
writes Sanchez-Pardo, “anxiety, guilt and the reparative tendency are 
only experienced when feelings of love for the object predominate over 
destructive impulses” (p. 144). Thus, it is guilt, as a result of the subject’s 
own hatred and aggression that gives rise to the need to restore, re-create 
and make reparation.1 
These feelings of anxiety and guilt linked to sadistic impulses play out 
very nicely in the relationship between the young Jimmy and his mother. 
Jimmy’s mother, no longer able to live with her husband’s work in genetic 
engineering, which she has come to find morally reprehensible, yet unable 
to leave the walls of the organic compound where she feels ‘like a prisoner,’ 
is in a deep depression when we first meet her in the novel. However, when 
she refuses to take ‘new pills’ for depression, Jimmy’s father states, “She’s 
got her own ideas,” foreshadowing her imminent departure (Atwood, p. 
25). She tries to explain to Jimmy why she objects to his father’s work at 
OrganInc Farms, but becomes discouraged when he resists her and pretends 
that he does not understand her even when he does: “these were the worst 
moments, for both of them” (p. 21). Jimmy remembers “more than anything” 
he had “wanted to make her laugh—to make her happy” yet at the same 
time the effects of his antagonistic behavior please him. He recalls:
the crying, with her head down on her arms. She would shake all over, gasp 
for breathe, choking and sobbing. He wouldn’t know what to do then. He 
loved her so much when he made her unhappy, or else when she made him 
unhappy; at these moments he scarcely knew which was which. He would pat 
her, standing well back as with strange dogs, stretching out his hand, saying, 
“I’m sorry, I’m sorry.” And he was sorry, but there was more to it: he was 
also gloating, congratulating himself, because he’d managed to create such an 
effect. He was frightened, as well. There was always the knife-edge: had he 
gone too far? (p. 33)
Jimmy’s feelings of guilt and remorse display signs of a strong-super ego, 
more characteristic of the melancholic and the feminine attitude. After 
Jimmy’s mother flees the compound, taking his one beloved possession 
with her, his pet rakunk, “He felt he’d disappointed her, failed her in some 
crucial way. He’d never understood what was required of him. If only he 
could have one more chance to make her happy” (p. 68). The confused 
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mixture of emotions—love and hate—Jimmy exhibits towards his mother 
after her departure is in sharp contrast to Crake’s lack of emotion altogether 
over his mother’s death. When Crake describes the ‘froth’ coming out of 
his mother’s mouth after an invasion of a deadly transgenetic staph, Jimmy 
cannot understand how he could be so ‘nil’ about it—“it was horrible, the 
thought of Crake watching his own mother dissolve like that. He himself 
wouldn’t have been able to do it” (p. 177). According to Klein, this lack 
of emotion, such as feelings of guilt, anxiety and remorse are the result of 
excessive projection, which leads to an aggressive object-relation (Sanchez-
Pardo, p. 140).2 “If projective identification is excessive, good parts of the 
personality are felt to be lost and the process results in an impoverishment of 
ego…[and] the loss of the capacity to love” (p. 140). In other words, excessive 
projection, which may take the form of aggression and violence, go hand 
in hand with a defective super-ego or a lack of moral conscience. Which in 
Crake’s case is extreme. After Crake releases the deadly RejoovenEsense 
virus on the public and the epidemic begins to spread, Jimmy recalls how 
“the fear, the suffering, the wholesale death—did not really touch [Crake]” 
(Atwood, p. 343). We might pause to ask, what leads to this kind excessive 
projection? Something we might equate with the Columbine massacre or 
other forms of wholesale violence and aggression we are witnessing today 
amongst youth culture. With her usual dark humor and wit, Atwood spells 
out one likely cause—the adolescent Jimmy and Crake spend hours on the 
Internet viewing pornography sites, assisted suicides sites (nitey-nite.com), 
and public executions (Brainfrizz.com). Jimmy and Crake are unable to 
distinguish reality from fantasy, even culture’s most solemn punishment, 
death by law, is called into question:
Crake said these incidents were bogus. He said the men were paid to do it, 
or their families were. The sponsors required them to put on a good show 
because otherwise people would get bored and turn it off…. Two to one it was 
all rehearsed…
“Do you think they’re really being executed?” [Jimmy] said. “A lot of them 
looked like simulations.”
“You never know, “ said Crake.
“You never know what?”
“What is reality?” (Atwood, p. 83)
Susan Isaacs writes that “reality-thinking cannot operate without concurrent 
and supporting unconscious phantasies; e.g. we ‘take things in’ with our ears, 
‘devour’ with our eyes, ‘read, mark learn and inwardly digest,’ throughout 
life” (Sanchez-Pardo, p. 168). Phantasy underlies introjection and works at 
establishing boundaries between the inside and outside world. But what 
happens when the boundaries between phantasy and reality become 
blurred as they have done over the Internet in Atwood’s account (and I am 
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sure I need not mention contemporary culture’s current fascination with 
reality TV)? Moreover, what happens when all the images (imagos, external 
objects) being consumed, introjected, are harmful to the psyche? As Jimmy 
remarks, “he didn’t want to tell Crake” that the images they were viewing 
were causing him “severe nightmares” (Atwood, p. 80). 
Mourning and Melancholia 
Mourning is the feeling of loss and depression. According to Klein, each 
time an individual experiences the loss of a real loved person or pain caused 
by an unhappy experience the infantile depressive position is re-activated 
(Sanchez-Pardo, p. 131). This means that the subject attempts to restore the 
lost object of love as well as reinstate his or her original good objects (the 
parents) which are felt to be lost. In normal cases of mourning, the subject is 
able to grieve the lost object and feels that life can go on (this is the stage in 
mourning at which suffering can be reparative and productive). However, 
in the case of melancholia, the mourner fails to reinstate the good internal 
objects in the ego. Melancholia is the result of “excessive introjection” and 
“defective or blocked projection.” When introjection is in full force, the 
mechanism of projection remains blocked (p. 63):
The violence of sadistic impulses and paranoid anxieties does not leave room 
for establishing good (whole internal objects. The individual is overwhelmed 
by the sense that there is nothing ‘good’ to hold onto, nothing good inside, and 
therefore nothing to recuperate. The feeling of emptiness and nothingness that 
the melancholic exhibits is due to a failure in introjection and to the infinite 
doubts and uncertainties that assail the subject who was unable to firmly 
establish his or her good internal objects. (Sanchez-Pardo, p. 131)
Melancholia is characterized by anxiety, insecurity and transformation. 
Jimmy, like Woolf’s Lily, exhibits classic melancholic symptoms of insecurity, 
self-doubt, unworthiness, self-absorption and fixation on the past. In To 
the Lighthouse, for instance, Lily is overcome by strong paranoid anxieties 
when faced with her blank canvas: “it was when she took her brush in hand 
that the whole thing changed. It was in that moments flight between the 
picture and her canvas that the demons set on her who often brought her 
to the verge of tears and made this passage from conception to work as 
dreadful as any down a dark passage for a child” (Woolf, p. 28). Sanchez-
Pardo describes Lily’s anxieties about creation as a “violent combat with 
the bad internal objects that want to deprive her of a sense of sight” (p. 266). 
Thus, “she often felt herself—struggling against terrific odds to maintain 
her courage; to say: ‘But this is what I see; this is what I see,’ and so to clasp 
some miserable remnant of her vision to her breast, which a thousand forces 
did their best to pluck form her. And it was too, in that chill and windy way, 
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as she began to paint, that there forced themselves upon her other things, 
her own inadequacy, her insignificance” (Woolf, p. 28). Like Lily, Jimmy 
believes that he can never “measure up”—that “Nothing he could achieve 
would ever be the right idea, or enough” (Atwood, p. 50). Instead he lies 
awake at night “berating himself, bemoaning his fate” (p. 312).
Melancholia or depressive states arise throughout life as “an acute 
response to the dangers and lethal traps with which external reality threatens 
our objects of love, admiration, and idealization. In a desperate attempt to 
safeguard the object at risk, its incorporation and preservation inside the 
psyche seems to be the most effective maneuver”(Sanchez-Pardo, p. 69). 
But this comes at a high cost—in the consuming and storing up of objects, 
an individual may become consumed by his or her own objects, which takes 
the form of a retreat from reality and, as Klein says, increases the feeling 
that the individual is left alone ‘with his misery’ (Sanchez-Pardo, p. 148). 
This of course is taken to a rather extreme case in Atwood’s novel. Jimmy 
is left alone in the world with only his memories and inner desires, culture 
is portrayed as xenophobic (encased within the compounds) guarded from 
the outside (the pleeblands). Melancholia opens up “a troubled interior 
space that poses a traumatic relationship with exteriority—and a battle is 
staged between inside and outside, interiority and exteriority, introjection 
and projection, mind and body, memory and desire” (p. 12). 
This war is staged beautifully in Oryx and Crake, which takes as its 
major theme the protection, transgression and total destruction of barriers 
and boundaries. This is best illustrated by the pigoons, trans-genetic pig 
hosts for growing foolproof human tissue organs that are able to “fend 
off attacks by opportunistic microbes and viruses” (Atwood, p. 22). As 
Jimmy explains, reflecting on his mother’s work at OrganInc Farms, “the 
bad microbes and viruses want to get through the cell doors and eat the 
pigoons from inside. Mummy’s job was to make locks for the doors” (p. 
29). When Pigoon pie and pigoon pancakes get served up for lunch at the 
OrganInc Farms cafeteria, Jimmy becomes “confused about who should 
be allowed to eat what…because he thought of the pigoons as creatures 
very much like himself” (Atwood, p. 24). It is quite fitting and ironic that 
after all human life has been destroyed the pigoons take over and become 
Snowman’s most dangerous predator. The references to viruses invading 
cells are too numerous to mention (e.g., a bulletin listed on the CorpSecorp 
website is devoted to this topic in the chapter entitled “Extinctathon”), and 
fear of disease and illness permeate the text “Illness had an element of 
shame to it; no one wanted to be contaminated by the illness of another 
… blamed and shunned” (p. 116). And it goes without saying, the deadly 
RejoovenEsense virus, manufactured at the hands of Crake, consumes the 
human race.
95
Mourning, Melancholia, and Death Drive Pedagogy
SUSAN MOORE
Atwood’s novel is a testimony to contemporary culture’s profound 
problem with boundaries. At one point Jimmy contemplates how ‘he’d grown 
up in walled spaces, and then had become one.” And then “thinking about 
the pleeblands—the outside—it made him slightly dizzy, as he imagined the 
desert might or the sea. Everything in the pleeblands seemed so boundless, 
so porous, so penetrable so wide-open, so subject to chance … over there 
on the other side of the safety barriers. Also dangerous” (Atwood, p. 196). 
The pleeblands (associated with his mother’s disappearance) are ‘wild’ and 
‘unruly.’ Jimmy finds the idea of them ‘mysterious’ and ‘exciting.’ After the 
deadly epidemic is unleashed, the walls and towers come tumbling down, 
and nature begins to sprout everywhere, weeds “poking up like whiskers 
all over the flat surface like wildness under the surface ready to irrupt at any 
time” (p. 226). “Hang on to the words” Jimmy tells himself. Language itself 
loses its ‘solidity’—‘dissolving,’ ‘disappearing,’ as nature reasserts itself. In 
Atwood’s vision, nature and the feminine are represented as always bubbling 
just beneath the surface—which I equate with Julia Kristeva’s theory of 
the ‘semiotic chora,’ feminine space which conceals itself, but upon-which 
the ‘symbolic’—language and culture—is possible. This is also suggested 
in a remark Jimmy makes about his mother: “Women, and what went on 
under their collars. Hotness and coldness, coming and going in the strange 
musky flowery variable-weather country inside their clothes—mysterious, 
important, uncontrollable” (p. 16). The text itself is also fragmented, almost 
schizophrenic at times, as it switches unconsciously between Snowman 
and Jimmy’s narrative voice and the voices that speak inside Snowman’s 
head. Moreover, the narrative, like Woolf’s novel, is written in stream of 
consciousness technique which, explains Sanchez-Pardo, “is a dramatic 
way of expressing a divided self in modernist texts” (p. 12).
Melancholia is experienced as an empty and uncertain space which 
allows the lost loved object to emerge. In To the Lighthouse this space is 
represented by Lily’s canvas and Mrs. Ramsay, and in Oryx and Crake, the 
Internet and Oryx. As Sanchez-Pardo explains, “When the absence of the 
object is recognized, the place the object originally occupied is experienced 
as space….‘ If this space is felt to contain the promise of the return of the 
object, it is felt to be benign…. If in contrast to this benign expectancy 
it is believed that space itself eliminates good objects … it is felt to be a 
malignant space. The belief in benign space depends ultimately on the love 
for the object surviving its absence, thus a place is kept for the object’s 
second coming’” (p. 215). There is some indication here that the outcome 
of these two novels may not be the same. For Lily, the canvas, a ‘glaring, 
hideously difficult white space’, is ultimately conceived (or hallucinated) 
as a benign space in which she attempts to rescue the lost-loved object. 
Whereas in Oryx and Crake, the Internet is conceived of as a malignant space, 
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as illustrated by the ‘Blood and Roses’ game. Jimmy recalls: “That was the 
trouble with Blood (bad objects) and Roses (good objects): it was easier 
to remember the Blood stuff. The other trouble was that the Blood player 
usually won, but winning meant that you inherited a wasteland” (Atwood, 
p. 80). The feeling of empty space also translates into something missing 
in the body and is experienced as extreme anxiety in the individual. Woolf 
captures this sense of anxiety nicely in a few lines where Lily is looking at 
the drawing room steps:
For how could one express in words these emotions of the body? Express that 
emptiness there? … The physical sensations that went with the bare look of 
the steps had become suddenly extremely unpleasant. To want and not to 
have, sent all up her body a hardness, a hollowness, a strain. And then to want 
and not to have—to want and want—how that wrung the heart, and wrung it 
again and again! (p. 241)
In both novels the mother figure is represented as uncertain, evasive 
and ambiguous. In To the Lighthouse Lily strives to restore the original good 
object (Mrs. Ramsay) in her painting, but becomes increasingly frustrated 
in her repeated failed attempts:
She must try to get hold of something that evaded her. It evaded her when she 
thought of Mrs. Ramsay; it evaded her now when she thought of her picture. 
Phrases came, Visions came. Beautiful phrases. But what she wished to get 
hold of was that very jar on the nerves, the thing itself before it had been made 
anything. (Woolf, p. 260)
Compare this to Jimmy’s description of Oryx:
She was a casketful of secrets. Any moment now she would open herself up, 
reveal to him the essential things, the hidden things at the core of life, or of her 
life, or of his life—the thing he was longing to know. The he’d always wanted. 
What would it be? (Atwood, p. 314)
Oryx is ‘pale and shadowy’ ‘she was never very forthcoming,’ ‘You can 
never pin her down’; if Jimmy ‘put out his hand he could touch her; but that 
would make her vanish’ (p. 113). As with Mrs. Ramsay, Oryx’s ‘vagueness’ 
and ‘evasiveness’ suggest the impossibility of ever restoring the lost loved 
object (p. 114). Moreover, when Jimmy desperately tries to discover Oryx’s 
origins and true identity, she coyly responds, ‘You want me to pretend? You 
want me to make something up?’ suggesting that any attempt to restore the 
lost loved object is fantasy/phantasy. How then are we to understand Lily’s 
achievement at the end of To the Lighthouse? Are Woolf’s and Atwood’s 
vision the same? A few lines in the chapter entitled “Twister,” where Jimmy 
talks to himself in the darkness, provide the reader with a clue. “Now he’s 
alone in the dark, ‘So what?’ he tells himself. ‘You were alone in the light. 
No big difference.’ But there is” (p. 237, emphasis added).
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Metaphors of darkness and light, as well as sinking and rising, are central 
to understanding the outcome in these two novels—and Atwood’s vision. 
I would just like to turn now to Sanchez-Pardo’s analysis in her chapter 
“Framing the Fetish: To the Lighthouse; Ceci n’est pas un roman” in Cultures 
of the Death Drive. For Klein anything that produces goodness, pleasure or 
satisfaction can take the place of the mother in the unconscious. Sanchez-
Pardo argues that in this case, the fetish of light is used to substitute the lost 
loved object. She suggests that the intense light that shines is also the light 
that blinds, representing mania (p. 236). We see this, for example, in this 
much quoted passage where a stroke of light from the Lighthouse brings 
Mrs. Ramsay close to a deadly jouissance (e.g. a phantasy of fusion):
She looked at the steady light, the pitiless, the remorseless, which was so much 
her, yet so little her, which had her at its beck and call (she woke in the night 
and saw it bent across their bed, stroking the floor), but for all that she thought, 
watching it with fascination, hypnotized, as if it were stroking with its silver 
fingers some sealed vessel in her brain whose bursting would flood her with 
delight, exquisite happiness, intense happiness, and it silvered the rough waves 
a little more brightly, as daylight faded away, and the blue went out of the sea 
and it rolled in waves of pure lemon which curved and swelled and broke upon 
the beach and the ecstasy burst in her eyes and waves of pure delight raced over 
the floor of her mind and she felt, It is enough It is enough! (Woolf, p. 89)
In the absence of light there is a melancholic descent into darkness and the 
unfathomable depths of self. Thus, “One shrunk with a sense of solemnity, 
to being oneself, a wedge-shaped core of darkness, something invisible to 
others…. Beneath it is all dark, it is all spreading, it is unfathomably deep, 
but now and again we rise to the surface that is what you see us by” (Woolf, 
p. 85 ). Here Sanchez-Pardo suggests the impossibility of recognizing or 
acknowledging the lost mother, “of reaching these depths … produces a 
split ego (manic-depression), parts of which rise to the surface while others 
remain beneath the water” (p. 239). Metaphors of light and darkness also 
pervade Atwood’s novel. Jimmy is a creature of ‘dimness and dusk,’ hiding 
in the ‘shade’ from the ‘punishing sun.’ He is ‘stuck in time past, the wet sand 
is rising. He’s sinking down’ (p. 338). However, unlike Lily’s ‘white fixation’ 
and Mrs. Ramsay’s rapture with the beam of light off the water, Jimmy 
takes precautions to protect himself from the ‘sun’s glare’ and the ‘evil rays 
that bounce off the water.’ Sanchez-Pardo argues that Woolf’s “attempts to 
replace the lost object of love with the aesthetic object of Lily’s canvas, or with 
her own writing, ultimately fail since the image of the good mother cannot 
either restored or retrieved” (p. 253).3 Instead, Sanchez-Pardo suggests that 
Lily’s ‘vision’ is a kind of ‘hallucination’ or ‘delusion’ mediated by the by 
the fetish of light: “Lily’s second of clarity, this second of ‘sudden intensity,’ 
operates in the mode of a hallucination, a screen memory, or a fetish of light 
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that melancholically covers what is lost and already introjected” (p. 253). 
Sanchez-Pardo concludes that Lily—and thereby Woolf—does not work 
through the melancholic position into mourning. 
By contrast, in Atwood’s vision, Jimmy witnesses his mother’s execution 
over the Internet, Oryx’s throat is slit, and at the end of the novel we are 
offered the image of Jimmy sitting in front of an empty computer screen:
he’d turn it off, sit in front of the empty screen. All the women he’d ever known 
would pass in front of his eyes in the semi-darkness, His mother too, in her magenta 
dressing gown, young again. Oryx came last, carrying white flowers. She looked at 
him, then walked slowly out of his field of vision, into the shadows. (p. 345) 
Do these lines suggest that Jimmy has finally come to terms with his past by 
acknowledging the loss of his mother and the impossibility of ever restoring her? 
On the final page of the novel, when Snowman approaches the three surviving 
humans, his fate is uncertain and the future of mankind unknown. Atwood’s 
final vision is ambiguous, avoiding fixity and closure, which significantly, 
in terms of identity formation, supports a Kleinian psychic system which is 
always ‘in flux and unsettled, always in a precarious, contingent, and transitory 
unfinished state” (Sanchez-Pardo, p. 131). My question is, then, does Atwood 
achieve what Woolf does (can)not? If I take Sanchez-Pardo’s analysis to be 
correct, then, yes. However, I am not so certain the outcome of To the Lighthouse 
is quite so unambiguous. It is true Lily is obsessed with having the unity of her 
painting preserved and a sense of wholeness. Even Woolf herself remarked 
of the To the Lighthouse “one has to have a central line down the middle of the 
book to hold the design together” (Lee, 1977, p. 478). And in “A Sketch from 
the Past” Woolf writes: “I suppose I did for myself what psycho-analysts do 
for their patients. I expressed some very long felt and deeply felt emotion. And 
in expressing it I explained it and then laid it (her mother) to rest” (Sanchez-
Pardo, p. 235). Certainly these comments made by Woolf suggest that when 
Lily has her ‘vision’ the matter (of her mother) is laid to rest. However, counter 
to Sanchez-Pardo’s reading of the novel and perhaps Woolf’s own read of the 
text, we must remember that the line that joins and unifies is also the line that 
divides, splits, cuts, separates, kills—a boundary—between melancholia and 
mourning. In this sense, I would suggest, the matter of Lily’s, indeed Woolf’s 
‘vision,’—the matter over whether or not the lost loved object is restored at 
the end of the novel—remains open and unresolved. Something I do believe is 
suggested by Woolf herself in these few lines from A Room of One’s own:
And the phantom was a woman, and when I came to know her better I called 
her…the Angel in the House…And when I came to write I encountered her 
with the very first words…. And she made as if to guide my pen…. I turned 
upon her and caught her by the throat. I did my best to kill her…. Had I not 
killed her she would have killed me…. She died hard … [but] she was always 
creeping back when I thought I had despatched her. (cited in Lee, 1977, p. 79)
99
Mourning, Melancholia, and Death Drive Pedagogy
SUSAN MOORE
Death Drive Pedagogy
And yet, in these times of dreary crisis, what is the point of emphasizing 
the horror of being? (Julia Kristeva)
Yet, I shall grieve, for melancholy is mortality remembered. (Djuna 
Barnes)
In this paper, I have begun to describe how anxiety and guilt resulting 
from feelings of aggression give rise to the restorative moment and set into 
motion subject identity formation. The subject is founded on the repeated 
failed attempts to restore a lost loved object that can never be recovered. 
Thus, subjectivity is formed on “what is the yet to come.” As Sanchez-Pardo 
puts it, “the depressive position marks a space of instability and vacillation 
that is located in our process of construction of ourselves. This space 
‘unveils’ the incompleteness and openness of self-construction” (p. 15). As 
such, within a Kleinian framework it is necessary for the subject to enter in 
and remain within a depressive position. The process of working through 
melancholia into mourning is referred to as death drive pedagogy. However, 
as Sanchez-Pardo suggests, death drive pedagogy can hardly be thought of 
as “revolutionary idea.” As one critic, Naomi Schor, puts it “In the market 
place of ideas there is no room and no time for mourning and melancholia. 
Mourning is viewed as shameful, not to say retrograde. Furthermore, in the 
age of postmodernist waning of affect, those who wish to bring back affects 
such as depression are not viewed as very good company” (cited in Sanchez-
Pardo, p. 8). Another critic, Fred Alford, remarks that the Kleinian account 
is “tragic” because “there is no redemption.” Moreover, he holds out “little 
hope for individual transformation on the basis of the importance granted to 
the death drive and aggressivity” (cited in Sanchez-Pardo, p. 180).
However, how can we not give heed to Klein’s theory of mourning and 
melancholia when loss, trauma, and aggression, not to mention insecurity 
and instability, are of such great contemporary concern, especially 
amongst our youth culture. We live in what Linda Singer calls “The Age 
of the Epidemic” (cited in Sanchez-Pardo, p. 392). Aids and terrorism, 
biological and political, have made us aware of contingency and death as 
a social event. Indeed I hope my Kleinian read of Oryx and Crake gives 
some indication of the importance Kleinian melancholic theory holds for 
contemporary social analysis. How can we make the leap from melancholia 
to this question of “What constitutes the condition of responsibility?” Or 
put another way, Jacqueline Rose asks, “contra Freud, not how mourning 
can be completed, but what is it that death, or remaining with death, might 
permit”(2003, p. 80). Sanchez-Pardo views death drive pedagogy as a form 
of “active resistance to the dispossession that the social as a devouring 
agent perpetrates upon the subject” (p. 8). In simple terms, she sees the 
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depressive position as form of critical agency and resistance against a 
culture that consumes and oppresses (identity). The step from melancholia 
to mourning, to what Sanchez-Pardo refers to as an “Ethics of Freedom,” 
is in recognizing and acknowledging what has been lost. How is this to be 
achieved in curriculum work and our everyday practice as educators? 
One answer to the significance of Klein’s thought for education is 
offered in the psychoanalytical writings and literary criticism of one of her 
successors, Julia Kristeva. As stated earlier, the appearance of anxiety and 
guilt, in response to the subject’s own sadistic impulses, gives rise to the 
restorative moment. Crucial then, to Klein’s formulation, as with Kristeva, is 
anxiety, which is a defense mechanism against a foreign or ‘strange’ element 
in the psyche. (e.g., What is lost cannot be restored, which leaves the subject 
with a feeling of real loss and emptiness which may be experienced as a 
thanatic threat. Anxiety is a response to this threat). In Kristeva’s formulation, 
following on Freud and Klein, the moment of ethical and pedagogical 
possibility is in ‘reaching out’ to the strangeness of an Other through which 
one is able to reconcile the strangeness within ( and therefore the loss):
It is through unraveling … the major dynamics of otherness, of love/hatred 
for the other, of the foreign component of our psyche—that, on the basis of the 
other, I become reconciled with my own otherness-foreignness, that I play on it 
and live by it…. toward an ethics for the irreconcilable. (Kristeva, 1988, p. 182) 
This identification with the ‘strangeness’ of an other provides the answer 
to the question of what education is in Kristeva’s ethics:
On the one hand the sense of the strangeness is a mainspring for identification 
with the other, by working out its depersonalizing impact by means of 
astonishment. On the other hand, analysis can throw light on such an affect 
but, far from insisting on breaking it down, it should make way for esthetics (some 
might add philosophy), with which to saturate its phantasmal progression and 
insure its cathartic eternal return. (1988, pp. 189–190, emphasis added)
Kristevan scholar Sara Beardsworth elaborates further on this point:
The two components of Kristeva’s ethics have fully emerged. Psychoanalysis 
throws light on the uncanny and the process of identification with the other—
working out the destructuration of the subject—that enables tolerance for 
the irreconcilable, and so the ethic of respect for the irreducible, On the 
other hand … we find psychoanalysis giving way to ‘esthetics (some might 
add philosophy).’ Aesthetics, and perhaps philosophy, would comprise the 
education component of Kristeva’s ethics. (Beardsworth, 2004, p.193)
Based on this reasoning, Beardsworth concludes that artworks and literature 
analyzed [such as in Kristeva’s writings, or in Sanchez-Pardo’s Cultures 
of the Death Drive, or in this present work], and the analyses themselves, 
“can be seen as that kind of work that fulfills Kristevan [and I would also 
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add Kleinian] ‘education.’” Thus, in terms of our practice as educators, this 
would simply mean that we would want to create as many opportunities 
for critical engagement with artwork and literature which let “what is lost, 
and so the loss, figure and be figured” (Beardsworth, 2004, p. 266). 
Indeed, I believe, Atwood provides us with a very important model, 
and that is ‘working through’ the cultural and emotional losses of our 
past means taking seriously individual and collective narratives of loss. 
As Stephen White has remarked, this “must involve not only mourning 
but also a sort of work on the aggression and resentment entailed by loss” 
(2000, p. 103). On this note, I give the final words to Sanchez-Pardo and 
Atwood who have helped me to understand how loss and trauma figure 
in our lives, and why it is so crucial to record our individual stories of loss, 
anxiety, guilt—and love: 
Ultimately, when this story of loss requires death, the writing must pass 
through the self of the witness who remains and holds a stubborn attachment 
to the reference. For if the ultimate commandment of History is not to forget, 
what can be more proper than the will to record. (Sanchez-Pardo, p. 393)
 Zero hour, Snowman thinks. Time to go. (Atwood, p. 374)
Endnotes
1.  For Kleinians, symbol formation (as a mode of projection) is a defense against the 
subject’s own aggressive internal objects and art is an expression of the depressive 
position. Thus, the death drive accounts for creativity. As Hanna Segal has argued 
“the death drive (understood as aggression, rage, and hatred) is denied less in 
great art than in any other human activity” (Sanchez-Pardo, p. 179).
2.  Excessive introjection may also cause an individual to feel encumbered by 
his or her internal ‘good’ objects, which can result in outpourings of affection 
and emotion as witnessed in Lily’s intimate feelings for Mrs. Ramsay (Woolf, 
pp. 28, 70) or “inexplicable … joy” and “irrational happiness” as witnessed in 
Jimmy’s feelings for a green caterpillar (Atwood, p. 41).
3.  Kristeva takes up the Kleinian notion that the lost object of love cannot be 
replaced in her critique of women’s writing (ecriture feminine). In this view, 
a special form of women’s writing is simply a kind of screen memory. For 
Kristeva, the feminine (semiotic) is already inscribed in language (symbolic). 
Interestingly, she is particularly hostile in her critique of Virginia Woolf’s 
writing:
In women’s writing, language seems to be seen from a foreign land; it is seen 
from the point of view of an asymbolic, spastic body. Virginia Woolf describes 
suspended states, subtle sensations and above all, colours—green, blue—but she 
does not dissect language as Joyce does. Estranged from language, women are 
visionaries, dancers who suffer as they speak. (quoted in Elizabeth Grosz, Sexual 
Subversions, 1989, p. 64)
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